By Ethiopians will go to the polls in June 2021 in a vote that is sure to plunge the Horn of Africa country into further chaos. The signs are ominous. Last week, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) released the list of political parties that met the candidate registration deadline.
Notably, the Oromia state (the most significant constituent member of the Ethiopian federation) is left without representation. The two largest and credible opposition parties in Oromia — the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) — were wedged out of the contest through systemic repression. Elections will not be held in Tigray due to active conflict. Opposition parties in the Somali region and the South are facing harassment and co-option.
Elections are not a panacea, but a widely-agreed roadmap for a competitive vote could ease the myriad crises convulsing Ethiopia. Importantly, a fair and free election is one of the key deliverables of the promised reform that started in April 2018 after the Oromo protests forced a political transition. Many had hoped that a genuinely free vote would set the country on a democratic path.
But the reform has since veered off far from the anticipated course. The incumbent government is caught in endless controversy and friction within and outside.
This is an attempt to briefly gauge how things got to where they are, whether they can be repaired, and weigh NEBE’s ability to deliver fair and free elections despite the challenges.
Ethiopia is one of those unusual states where political elites maintain conflicting views about the past and advance divergent political priorities about the future. It was in no small degree because of these inexplicable divergences and lack of shared focus on democratic agenda that opportunities for reform were lost in 1974 and 1991. Without a judicious action by the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) and the rest of the political elites, Ethiopia is again on the verge of tossing away another splendid prospect to transform itself into a stable democracy.
Clash of views
Two conflicting arguments have dogged political discourse in Ethiopia, particularly since the 1960s. It needs to be resolved sensibly in the interest of all concerned.
On the one side are the policies advanced by devotees of the old governing class who claim divine right to govern the country with concurrent aim to maximize their class interests. This lot insists on bringing back in some form or another the flopped unitary state with one language and associated attributes, which is inimical to the aspirations of the country’s diverse peoples. There does not seem so far credible traces of pro-democracy inclinations within the politics of this camp.
The most “moderate” elements of these right-wing conservatives propose scrapping the current Ethiopian constitution and creating new regions, which would then be ruled by minority urban elites extracted chiefly from a distinct mono-cultural background. This group opposes even elementary democratic principles and internationally accepted rights to self-rule, which they denounce as racist or tribalist. They brashly assert that it is the source of all problems ailing Ethiopia. Put simply, these elements are out to undermine, directly and indirectly, genuine democratic reforms, particularly self-rule and fair and free elections, which they fret are bound to empower hitherto marginalized peoples mainly in the south and east of the country.
On the opposite spectrum are representatives of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia whose identity and rights have been trampled upon for so long. These are committed to a system that can guarantee individual liberty for all and each nation’s human and democratic rights to govern their affairs and participate in a voluntary union on a fair and equal basis. Their viewpoint constitutes the essence of the constitutional settlement of 1991, which is now under attack by the right-wing conservatives in Ethiopia and beyond. These crowds earnestly believe the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) failure to implement the constitution and its manipulation and misuse of the self-determination principle does not and should not invalidate the legitimacy of the ideals enshrined in the document.
It is important to remember that the constitutional settlement of 1991 that saw the defeat of the Marxist regime resulted from decades of struggle against imperial autocracy for the right to self-determination. It would be a terrible mistake to forget there were over a dozen armed national liberation movements in the country, some dating from the days of the emperor, which brought about both military and political collapse of the old governing class. Few, if at all, doubt that the defunct monarchical and dictatorial system was detrimental to diversity, equality, and self-rule. Some nostalgics are exalting the era of imperial aristocracy as Ethiopia’s glorious days. The majority of Ethiopia’s people have no desire to see it come back under any pretext or guise.
This gulf between the unitary camp and multinational federalists underscores the futility of elections in Ethiopia. An all-inclusive dialogue is needed to narrow differences or reach a common understanding on crucial issues. The dialogue should underscore individual freedom and the indisputable right of groups who have known only oppression and betrayal for so long. Failing these, peace and stability will remain a pipe dream, and Ethiopia will be in permanent chaos, which benefits no one.
In the absence of some measure of concord among major political players on critical issues, including the background and validity of the 1991 constitutional settlement, a fair and credible election is unthinkable.
The PP (and a few of their hangers-on) can, of course, tread in the footsteps of the TPLF to compete against themselves and win most or all of the seats in parliament. That, however, does not take Ethiopia a step towards resolving principal issues confronting it.
Tasks and trials of the 2018 reform
The demise of the TPLF-dominated Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister in April 2018 was a welcome event for most peoples of Ethiopia and their well-wishers. There was enormous optimism that Abiy would finally help Ethiopia realize a democratic transition. The young leader was full of uplifting optimism and seemingly sincere promises.
At the time of his appointment, Abiy was the leader of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO), now transformed into PP.
The OPDO was one of the four TPLF-controlled coalition partners in the EPRDF. Even though the TPLF used its OPDO surrogates to quell the OLF rebellion and repress and exploit Oromo resources, the OPDO belatedly won plaudits for its support for the 2014-18 mass movement that toppled the TPLF regime.
Oromia is home to the Qeerroo movement that spearheaded the countrywide uprising to bring the TPLF domination to an end. With the demographic weight of Oromia, its economic contribution, and the history of Oromo struggle fighting for the right to self-determination, equality, and principled respect for other peoples’ rights, many believed there was a perfect chance to move towards genuine democracy.
Except for a few skeptics, who called for a transitional arrangement, many people wanted to believe the young premier would honor his pledge to complete the parliamentary term of his predecessor and set the country on a democratic path by conducting fair and free elections, which would be a first in the country’s history. Positive steps were taken early in the reform process, such as releasing political prisoners, tolerating freedom of expression, and unbanning formerly exiled and outlawed political parties. These steps boosted the confidence in Ethiopia’s prospect of a democratic future.
On top of encouraging internal reforms, Abiy’s decision to end the state of “no war, no peace” with neighboring Eritrea earned him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.
Abiy’s profile and esteem rose higher on the wings of those welcome events than anything former Ethiopian leaders have ever dreamt of or attained. He was showered with enormous goodwill and support, which should have spurred him to entrench and speed up the reforms.
However, gradually, events began to come to the fore exposing his deceptive appearances and false promises.
First, a seemingly benign decision rang the alarm bell. Preparations to conduct a decennial census were quietly abandoned at the last minute and after many resources were already spent. It was blamed on the lack of safety in some parts of the country. That sounded sensible enough given low-level conflicts here and there, but political concerns could not be counted out. Then, the coronavirus provided a pretext to postpone the election indefinitely. There were protests and criticism of the decision, primarily from the OLF, OFC, and a few opposition parties. Among the fractured EPRDF coalition, only the TPLF spoke out against it. Considerable suspicion set in that a sinister political manipulation might be behind the move.
This was given added credence when PP justified the postponement by weaving together porous constitutional interpretation using a loyalist crowd among the aspiring members of the Addis Ababan elite. Many of the “professional” witnesses who endorsed the dubious constitutional interpretation were either adherents or supporters of the old governing class’s policies, which seem to profess an inherent affinity for autocracy. The string of suspicious incidents gradually started flaking the solemn trust placed in Abiy, who until then has been given the benefit of the doubt by so many Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia.
Eventually, even as Abiy continued to enjoy some residual high marks, particularly among the right-wing elements, events in Oromia started to change for the worse.
The OLF-PP mistrust
Suspicion and differences between the PP and the OLF (and other Oromo parties) are rooted in their contrasting background. The history of the OLF is wholly entwined with the 50-plus year Oromo struggle for democracy and self-determination, while the PP in its previous incarnation as OPDO was a 1989 TPLF creation from captured Derg soldiers with the chief objective of eliminating the OLF. In the intervening years, it served as a transmission belt for the TPLF writ in Oromia.
Perhaps, despite the unprecedented changes in 2018, some elements within the OPDO did not let go of the toxic TPLF teaching that OLF was an enemy to be excluded at all cost. This could have been aggravated by anxiety over the OLF acceptance among Oromo, as demonstrated, for instance, by the vast crowd that welcomed the party home on 15 September 2018 in Finfinne. Perhaps, as some PP officials lament, OLF did not give OPDO cadres credit for their belated support for the Qeerroo movement against the TPLF.
Whatever the case, the OPDO ignored the agreement it concluded with the OLF on behalf of the Ethiopian government and resorted to harassment and intimidation of OLF members and supporters only within a few months of OLF leaders returning to Ethiopia. This was later followed by mass detention, physical abuse, and the killing of individuals suspected of having an opinion different from the OPDO.
OPDO then put many administrative zones in Oromia under illegal military command posts. Detentions and killings in the western and southern parts of Oromia surpassed the level before the demise of the TPLF regime. The Abiy administration’s agreement with the OLF was simply rendered irrelevant by the security forces’ persistent hostility.
Despite the deteriorating situation, as required by the agreement between the two parties, the OLF undertook to expedite its end of the bargain. Hence, most of its fighters were made to submit to a half-hearted program to reintegrate them into society. However, due to official foot-dragging, the process was not up to scratch to accomplish the normal function of “demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration to society.” A small fraction of OLF fighters declined to join a scheme they saw as utterly unfit for purpose. They thought the OLF leadership was wrong to trust the OPDO, which, they said, is bound to renege on the agreement in its entirety.
On that account, they parted company with the OLF, putting themselves outside its structures. The PP regime’s regressive actions seem to have proven right those previously within the OLF ranks and others who expressed doubt about the sincerity of the ruling party in keeping the transition on track.
Selective bullying
The assassination in June 2020 of prominent Oromo artist Haacaaluu Hundeessaa was a climax of slow but continuous purging of potentially independent and neutral voices in many localities in Oromia. In the wake of Haacaaluu’s slaying, more than 160 people were killed and tens of thousands detained in military barracks, schools, and makeshift prisons without any due process.
In particular, the PP regime used Haacaaluu’s killing to detain, on flimsy grounds, dozens of leading members of the OLF and OFC leadership.
Many of these are taken to court with trumped-up charges, with no prospect of justice. Thousands of Oromo detainees are denied even the opportunity to face formal charges in front of a court of law. Most detainees face political accusations with no substantive legal basis to go by and no prospect of a fair trial.
As in the EPRDF days, some detainees were subjected to PP indoctrination and most unpleasant propaganda and released while others remain languishing in detention. But the overwhelming majority remain in official and non-official prisons, including schools turned into detention centers.
Several leading members of OLF and OFC leadership, who are currently in prison, including Bekele Gerba, Gamachu Ayana, Jawar Mohammed, and many others, recently staged a lengthy hunger strike, protesting their political detention and the mistreatment of thousands of Oromo detainees who share their aspiration and face the same fate.
Despite the many uncertainties, preparation for election seems underway, and parties are at a stage where they would submit their candidates for election wards in which they wish to contest.
However, the two main Oromo parties with a considerable following, the OLF, and OFC, seem deliberately incapacitated from submitting their candidates. Many of their leaders are in detention. Almost all their offices are closed, and tens of thousands of their members and supporters, including potential candidates in different localities, are in custody or hiding. Put simply, the PP regime has disabled them from fielding candidates to contest seats.
Periodic election of leaders is a central plank of Oromo Gadaa heritage, whose realization is among the OLF and OFC’s top political objectives. If matters continue as they are now, both the OLF and OFC will be without any direct representation in both the federal parliament and the Oromia national council (Caffee Oromiyaa).
It would indeed be an unforgivable offense to deprive the people of Oromia of the right to vote for the party and persons of their choice. It is a terrible offense against the reform movement for which the Oromo youth paid the ultimate price in their thousands.
Denying the Qeerroo (youth) electoral representation would amount to a political crime of the highest order for which PP and its leader shall bear ultimate responsibility.
In the circumstances, wisdom is called for to save the day by postponing the June 2021 elections and engage in an inclusive dialogue to chart the path forward, release all political prisoners, give the two Oromo parties and others the time to resume their political work, including fielding candidates and preparing for the elections.
To proceed with elections in the current atmosphere without taking corrective measures will lead to yet another unforgivable sham election. PP will bear historical responsibility for denying Oromia and the rest of Ethiopia the right to be represented by parties and leaders they freely elected.
An election in which parties with a genuine popular base are prevented from taking part is nothing but an unnecessary chore and tragic waste of resources.
Weak institutions and creeping autocracy
There is no question that the 1995 constitution gives immense executive powers to the head of government. Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi made sure that the document gave him extensive clout. In a normal society, there should have been no need for him to interfere in regional affairs, for example, but he always did, which partly paved the way for the eventual demise of the TPLF.
Following in Zenawi’s footsteps, Abiy Ahmed seems quite unsatisfied with the extensive constitutional powers. He routinely interferes in regional matters, including the selection and removal of regional executives. Besides, institutions like regional assemblies, which played some role under EPRDF, seem obscured, which stunts autonomy and kills local talents. The PP machinery is quietly reimposing Amharic throughout the regions. It all adds to the subtle implementation of the old governing class’s policies, extremely prejudicial to the development of other languages.
The efficiency and fairness of the institutions such as the judiciary and the NEBE are crucial in the democratic reform process. However, courts continue to behave much the same way as they have done under EPRDF. In rare instances, when, against all expectations, judges have granted bail or ordered the release of suspects against whom prosecutors have no case. In many such instances, the police simply ignored court orders and kept suspects in custody, thus undermining the idea that law is supreme and court orders are meant to be carried out.
Similarly, NEBE has a central role in the reform agenda. Pursuant to the relevant law, it is responsible for registering parties, ensuring transparency and fairness in supervising the electoral process from voter registration, registration of candidates, campaign, actual voting, and declaration of results. In a country that has known no fair and free elections, its task is quite enormous.
The Board has fared well thus far, but there are worrying signs. For example, many registered political parties point to the lack of adequate action from NEBE when they complain against PP harassment and intimidation of their members in different localities. Harassment and complaint are most likely to continue if elections go ahead.
Recently, NEBE issued a surprising criticism of the PP not for misuse of government resources but for using a campaign rally to denounce opposition parties. The rebuke responded to a complaint by one of the Amhara nationalist parties chastised at rallies organized by the PP Oromia branch. Beyond those statements, the events left the public and contending parties with mixed feelings about the impartiality and effectiveness of the NEBE.
It is doubtful that a free and fair contest can be organized in the face of creeping autocracy and less than adequate and sometimes questionable performances by weak institutions such as courts and NEBE.
Conclusion
The retreat of the TPLF into Tigray under the pressure of Qeerroo presented Ethiopia with an opportunity to put the country on the road to peaceful democratic reform. The appointment of Abiy Ahmed was celebrated widely and won him quick accolades.
Positive early changes such as the release of political prisoners, tolerance of freedom of expression, and allowing previously banned parties to participate in a peaceful political process raised expectations very high.
However, things started to go askew soon. One of the first signs of nostalgic revisionism was Abiy singing the glory of the past and ignoring the forces and issues that brought him to power in the first place. Also, using a dubious pretext, he managed to postpone elections.
The regime flouted agreements made with parties such as OLF, blocking them from participating in peaceful political work. Almost a state of war was imposed in Oromia within a few months of Abiy assuming power. Tensions, conflicts, and crackdowns crept up unabated elsewhere, particularly in the South.
The closure of OLF and OFC offices, the detention of many of their leaders, and thousands of their members and supporters have made it virtually impossible for them to participate in the June 2021 elections. Many of their leaders, at all levels, are in detention on trumped-up charges.
The war in Oromia has now been extended to Tigray, where a foreign expeditionary force is entrenched and reportedly causing havoc and committing atrocities, including robbery, rape, and wanton destruction of lives and property.
The foreign forces involved in the war in Tigray are openly hostile to the democratic process in Ethiopia. As things stand, conflict within the country and the causes of the many-sided conflict remain unchanged. And, part of internal strife is internationalized, which makes the situation worse.
Given these circumstances, the following measures need to be prioritized before rushing to the planned elections.
- An inclusive dialogue would be necessary to understand the causes of conflicts and agree on the best way to carry out a fair and free election.
- All political prisoners need to be released without precondition and allowed to resume their political activities.
- All registered parties whose activities are restricted, including the OLF and OFC, should be given time to prepare and participate in the elections.
- Foreign interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs must be prohibited, and all foreign forces should withdraw from the country.
- Relationships with all foreign countries must follow the standard practice specified in international law, treaties, customs, and conventions. Relationships with all neighboring countries, including Eritrea, must be conducted accordingly.
- The PP regime and all political players must commit to ending all armed conflict by peaceful means.
Ramming through elections without considering these critical steps amounts to anointing the increasingly despotic PP and its leader. That would mean a tragic loss of democracy in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region.
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