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The political and security crisis in northern Ethiopia continues to expand. It has pulled in all states in the Ethiopian federation as regional authorities send ethnic militias and paramilitary forces to aid the embattled Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) in the Tigray conflict. The nearly ten-month-long conflict has engulfed the Afar and Amhara states, causing an enormous humanitarian crisis. As both parties seek total military victory, the war is likely to spread further afield.
The Tigray conflict has received considerable media and international attention. But the tragedy unfolding in the North must be understood within the context of broader political challenges in Ethiopia. It is a microcosm of the political tensions and security crisis the country has faced over the last three years. Currently, the government is arming and training civilians massively, particularly in the Amhara region, in the name of the fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). People are selling their oxen to buy guns. Many are changing plowshares into arms, which indicates the imminence of more ethnic violence in the future. This has significant consequences for the ongoing violent conflicts in other parts of Ethiopia, especially in the Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia regions.
The conduct of the Tigray war and the occupation of contested territories by Amhara forces resonate in other parts of the country, particularly in the Metekel zone of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. Metekel is one of the resourceful areas claimed by the Amhara groups, including the Amhara regional state. In other words, the occupation of Raya, Wolkait, and Tsegede by the Amhara forces and the support they have been receiving from the federal government has a direct repercussion for the peace and stability in the Metekel zone.
Many people in Metekel know that their region will be the next battleground if the allied forces prevail against Tigrayan troops and secure the Amhara-claimed territories in the west and southern Tigray. As with Wolkait-Tsegede, the Amhara consider and claim that Metekel was “illegally” given to the Benishangul Gumuz state by the TPLF-led transitional government in the early 1990s. The Amhara make similar territorial claims against other neighboring states, notably Oromia. In other words, despite the anti-Tigrayan rhetoric and public mobilization in the name of sovereignty, the violence in northern Ethiopia is in no small part driven by Amhara expansionist irredentism and assimilationist clamor that will only exacerbate ethnic violence in Metekel Zone and other parts of Ethiopia.
Festering violence in Metekel
It has been three years since the Benishangul Gumuz region devolved into a catastrophic cycle of violence that continues to deepen. The worst happened on 23 December 2020 when unidentified armed groups killed more than 207 people in a day in ethnically targeted violence. Although the Metekel zone has been under the military Command Post since September 2020, ethnic-based conflict continues to unfold, exacerbating the security and human rights situation. In the most recent attacks, on 22 July 2021, the former commander of the Benishangul Gumuz Special Forces, Ferede Boji, and his team were killed in Odaa Bulidigilu Woreda of Assosa zone.
The violence in Bulen Woreda was aggravated in mid-July with the killing of unarmed civilians reportedly by Gumuz militias. Between July 9 and 10, sixteen people were killed in Emanji Kebele in Bulen woreda, according to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. On July 15, eight people were killed by the Gumuz militia while 4,000 residents were displaced in the Kamashi zone, another flashpoint, and one of the three zones in the Benishangul Gumuz state.
Minorities continue to pay the highest price in the deteriorating security situation. The federal Command Post was empowered by imposing curfews, banning meetings and demonstrations, blocking the internet, mobile networks, and restricting movements. In Bulen woreda, this authority was misused to arrest critics and those deemed as a threat. For example, the attempt by the Shinasha people, an indigenous ethnic minority in the region, to defend themselves received a brutal response from the security forces, followed by mass arrests. The Shinasha are sandwiched between the expansionist Amhara forces and the Gumuz militias. Abiy’s government is either unable or unwilling to address political tensions and protect minorities.
On 18 May 2021, the regional government announced signing a peace agreement with Gumuz militias at Gilgele Beles, the administrative center of the Metekel zone. However, it is not paying any dividends. It was clear from the beginning that the deal was a short-term fix aimed at appeasing the militias and buying time for PP leaders to garner the remaining votes from the postponed election. Although the regional government offered a package of incentives that included sharing power with the militias at the zonal and regional levels, the militias continued to kill civilians in all three zones. This is not surprising because the demobilized militias were reportedly released with their arms from the rehabilitation centers and allowed to join the public with their arms.
Unholy regional alliances
The conflicts in Ethiopia are complicated by the ruling elite’s political expediency and unholy alliances between regional special forces. Recruiting, training, and graduating regional special forces and parading them before state-run media outlets has become commonplace in recent years. The paramilitary forces are organized along ethnic lines, which many observers fear will lead to a regional arms race and more ethnic violence. The federal government is using all resources at its disposal to depict TPLF as a common national enemy. This is accompanied by genocidal rhetoric and a narrative of animosity and ethnic rivalry. As all nine regional states mobilize forces against the TPLF, which was proscribed as a terrorist organization on 7 May 2021, the civilian militarization and hotchpotch alliance between regional special forces raises eyebrows.
Worryingly, the deployment of regional paramilitary forces is not limited to Tigray. In July, special forces from Gambela, Sidama, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNP) were deployed in Benishangul Gumuz, as things were spinning out of control of the Command Post in the Metekel zone. However, despite the reinforcement, the Command Post and the regional government are administering only urban centers and surrounding kebeles. Most rural kebeles are under the Gumuz militias. For instance, in Bulen woreda, out of 21 kebeles, 14 are under the control of the militia.
It was a shame that the Benishangul Gumuz state, which could not maintain peace and order locally, is sending special forces to help the Amhara region fight against the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF). Paradoxically, the deployment to northern Ethiopia happens while the SNNPR, Gambela, and Sidama Special Forces marched in the opposite direction towards the Metekel zone.
Electoral nightmare
The ethnic violence in Benishangul Gumuz is the direct result of the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) conspiracy to disband the regional coalition of oppositions. PP cadres knew that they would lose in the region if the Berta, Gumuz, and Shinasha opposition parties came together and formed an alliance. Many people in the area, particularly indigenous groups, consider PP the extended arm of expansionist and assimilationist Amhara forces.
Before authorities postponed the 2020 national election, a coalition of the Boro Democratic Party, the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement, and the Gumuz People Democratic Movement were out-organizing and outplaying local PP representatives. Sensing an inevitable electoral rout, PP worked day and night to manipulate and disband regional alliances to preempt an electoral defeat. The PP instigated and used the Gumuz-Shinasha conflict to undermine and demobilize the coalition of opposition forces. In the short term, the plan served the myopic goal of the incumbent, but in the long run, it will exacerbate the catastrophic cycle of ethnic violence in the restive region.
Due to security reasons, the June 2021 election was not conducted in most parts of the Benishangul Gumuz state. The election was not held in Metekel and Kamashi zones and Odaa Bulidigilu woreda of the Assosa zone. Logistical problems and fraud overshadowed the election results in parts of the Assosa zone where voting occurred. The results in Sherkole woreda were subject to recounting due to irregularities and lack of credibility. Nevertheless, the electoral board approved the outcome, resulting in 22 regional seats – all won by PP. Voting was canceled or unapproved by the electoral board in all other constituencies. The regional council has 99 seats, and establishing a regional government needs at least 50 seats; however, results are thus far known for only 22 seats, which will not allow for establishing a regional government.
The likelihood of conducting an election on September 6, 2021, seems slim due to the simmering ethnic tensions and security problems. The displaced people have not yet returned to their villages. The Sedal and Agalometi woredas are reportedly under the total control of the militias. The tenure of the incumbent regional government, which was controversially extended by one year, ends in September 2021. In this context, what will happen to the regional government after 30 September 2021 remains unclear.
The way forward
Ethiopia’s rainy season is passing unnoticed. The summer season was wasted in many parts of Ethiopia. Despite the chorus of calls for political dialogue, warmongering regional and national leaders continue to mobilize the youth toward war fronts. Authorities are organizing state-sponsored rallies in all major cities and towns in support of the war. Coupled with the security problems that had prevented people from farming their land, the massive public mobilization to war fronts will exacerbate humanitarian needs in the coming year.
The wartime national mobilization and state-sponsored rallies have reached the violence-affected Metekel zone. With the involvement of several actors in the violence, including international actors, the pathway to peace in the resourceful Metekel zone will not be easy. The people of Metekel are watching the federal government’s support for the Amhara state and militia warily as they occupy disputed territories and attempt to alter the constitutional order forcefully.
Of course, several political forces in Ethiopia think they can alter constitutional order by mobilizing the youth and using force. However, this attitude is detrimental to the country’s stability and undermines justice institutions and peaceful ways of resolving conflicts. In Metekel, working toward a lasting solution requires a properly functioning federal system and respect for the constitutional order. It needs to protect indigenous groups and minority rights from the tyranny of the majority and their expansionist and assimilationist ideologies.
The federal government should handle this war carefully. Instead of massively mobilizing the youth along ethnic lines, it will be helpful for the state to use the national army to tackle insecurity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s vacuous strategic alliance with Amhara forces and his reckless support for their occupation of territories previously administered by the TPLF is being watched closely in other parts of the country, particularly in the Metekel zone. Left unchecked, the Prime Minister’s partisan and transactional political alliances may ultimately tear Ethiopia asunder.
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