The other civil war in Ethiopia: Bungled deal and escalating attacks in Oromia

The war on Tigray has eclipsed a dragging civil war in the Oromia regional state. At least eight extrajudicial killings were reported this week alone as the Oromia Special Police intensified the crackdown on civilians in the shadows of the Tigray war. The Ethiopian government has been waging a brutal insurgency campaign against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Wallaga, Guji, and Borana zones for nearly two years.

The civil wars illustrate the failure of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government to handle the political transition and the peace process it signed with formerly exiled groups in 2018. The bungled peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was doomed from the start. It also underscores the Abiy administration’s lack of interest in peacemaking.

The government was quick to embrace other rebel groups but hesitated toward the OLF, which posed a direct threat to the premier’s electoral chances. The ruling elites in Oromia were also divided on how to handle the peace process and the reintegration of OLA rebels.

Mutual antagonization between OLF and the government grew as they traded accusations for failing to uphold their end of the bargain, culminating with OLA breaking away from the OLF and the latter belatedly acquiring a registration license from the electoral board. The divorce did not end OLF’s troubles with a government that was intent on keeping the party at bay. The government recently orchestrated yet another splintering of the OLF and has largely sidelined its longtime chairman Dawud Ibsa.

Ethiopian history teaches us that armed resistance becomes fashionable whenever the window for nonviolent and peaceful struggles is closed. A year ago, OLA was a shadowy breakaway faction. However, as the state’s repression of the Oromo deepened, the group’s appeal and fortunes have risen.

OLA and the Ethiopian state

The establishment of OLA itself was linked to the closure of the Afran Qallo band and the Macha Tulama Association, both formed in the early 1960s to educate the Oromo masses and create national self-awareness among the Oromo people.

When the Haileselassie regime detained, sentenced to death, and hanged in public leaders of the Macha Tulama and shut down the association in 1967 for nurturing Oromo nationalism, the remaining members launched a more radical, clandestine pan-Oromo movement that later led to the formation of OLF in 1974. In fact, OLA—led by Elemo Qilxu—had already been in the field in 1973 (Eastern Oromia), one year ahead of the establishment of OLF. This means that OLA started its liberation war independently of the OLF, though later on, they integrated into one entity.

The socialist dictatorship of Mengistu Hailemariam continued the military response to the question of nationalities until it was overthrown in 1991 by a loose coalition of liberation fronts, including the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the OLF. EPLF created an independent Eritrea, while TPLF controlled political power in Ethiopia by creating people’s democratic organizations (PDOs), some of which later morphed into the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), while others were dubbed as affiliates.

The OLF was forced to walk out of the Transitional Government (1991-1994), and it vowed to continue the armed struggle. Eritrea hosted OLF leaders and some troops until 2018. Abiy visited Asmara and met with OLF leaders in July 2018, three months after he became prime minister; Lamma Magarsa (then president of Oromia) and Workineh Gebeyehu (Foreign Minister at the time) finalized the peace deal with OLF in Asmara in August. OLF leaders and fighters were welcomed in Addis Ababa that September.

OLA’s disarmament and split from OLF

The OLF troops returned to Ethiopia and started training to integrate into society; some of them even joined the Oromia Police. In the meantime, the OLF began to complain about the treatment of its troops in training camps. It also further complained that authorities in Oromia unilaterally decided on the contents of training documents, implying biased indoctrination attempts. Amid this contention, some of the OLA operating in western and southern Oromia accepted calls for disarmament from elders and prominent individuals, including Jawar Mohammed and Bekele Gerba. However, others stood firm and refused to disarm, accusing the government of violating the peace deal. The OLF also complained that “we were invited back to Ethiopia to be part of the reform, not to watch it from the sidelines.” The OLF repeatedly called for its troops to be integrated into the national army, not regional police forces. Moreover, the government’s refusal to commit to a transitional roadmap ahead of the election frustrated members of the OLF. The government cited the refusal of OLA to disarm and questioned OLF’s commitment to electoral politics.

Caught in between, the OLF leadership formally distanced itself from OLA, by “transferring” the management of the militants to the Oromo Abba Gadaa Council in 2019. For OLF, its ability to attain a registration certificate and pursue a peaceful political struggle hinged on severing its ties with OLA, even if begrudgingly so. As Abiy consolidated and centralized power, OLA felt vindicated by the actions of the government and declared that it was no longer accountable to the political leadership of the OLF seated in Addis Ababa.

Undermining the OLA

At first, the government employed a wait and see strategy. The official thinking was to let the people see and enjoy a group they revere, and when the public starts to get bored with them, it will be easy to get rid of the OLA. The fear was that if the government opened the war on OLA before the honeymoon was over, the people would hate the ruling party, so, the strategy was to let things deteriorate gradually. In other words, the state did not take immediate measures against the OLA despite calls for it to do so for political reasons.

Furthermore, Abiy had to wait for some time since, at the time, he did not take full control of the army and intelligence services. This was the official position, and Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) leaders who raised concerns about the deteriorating security situation were told to be patient. Furthermore, the internal discourse among the ODP was that “we need an armed faction to fight with and we will use it as an excuse to squash any challenge to our power.”

The sentiment of “OLA should live, and powerless OLA should live with us” was circulating within the top leadership of the ODP. OLA was a pretext to crush all opponents. The OLA was swift in taking over local administrations in four Wallaga zones, two Guji zones, and the Borana zone. After witnessing all of that, the government started to say, “people are tired of feeding the OLA and they want us to take irreversible measures against it.” Officials then started a media campaign targeting the OLA and established military Command Posts in western and southern Oromia in early 2019.

The government christened OLA as “Oneg-Shane or OLF Shane” because of what the name (especially its Afaan Oromo equivalent, WBO) evokes among the Oromo. State-run media outlets and paid social media warriors intensified the defamation campaign against OLA.

The military Command Posts had no legal basis; they were not approved by parliament and therefore had no accountability framework. In the last two years, the Command Posts did not report to any legislative body, be it the regional council or federal parliament. They did not hand over the rules of engagement in the areas they controlled to the civilian government.

The government deployed troops, including air assets, to eliminate the OLA within two weeks under the guise of “restoring and enforcing rule of law,” but the civil war continues to linger. OLA’s armed movements have expanded to other zones, particularly to South, West, and North Shawa.

The government continues to condemn the OLA as brutal bandits and recently branded them as “agents of TPLF” in Oromia. The OLA, on the other hand, accused the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) of being Trojan horses for a neo-neftegna system, an assimilationist unitary political order. OLA repeatedly blamed Abiy for advancing anti-Oromo politics and policies.

Shifting support: from Abiy to OLA

When Abiy was appointed Prime Minister in April 2018, no other leader had such popularity in the entire African continent. His acceptance gradually evaporated in Oromia as the regime attacked opponents in the name of OLA and tightened political spaces. The controversial formation of the PP completely alienated him from his Oromo base. Abiy even lost the support of his close friends and supporters due to his reckless move to create a unitarist party.

In effect, the government discouraged nonviolent struggle and peaceful grassroots activists. This has helped the OLA regain some lost ground among the Oromo. OLA has seen a major recruitment boost across Oromia following the political assassination of iconic Oromo artist Haacaaluu Hundeessa and the arrests of Jawar, Bekele, and several OLF leaders. Beyond the verbal gymnastics about the opening of the political space, peaceful demonstrations and the right to assembly are not allowed in Ethiopia today. Every peaceful means of protest has been shut down.

Many Oromo youths (Qeerroo) went into hiding as the government unleashed a brutal crackdown in the aftermath of Haacaaluu’s murder. Thousands of Qeerroo and Qarrees were arrested. Those who escaped the arrest and left towns in droves have joined the OLA to prepare for the inevitable battle for Oromia. When peaceful nonviolent means are impossible, armed resistance becomes the ultimate and only option for the youth. OLA now appears to be expanding its presence to all Oromia zones.

OLA’s reach across Oromia 

In early November, there were intense confrontations between OLA and Oromia special forces in areas around Hidhabu Abote, Dagam, and Muger towns. OLA’s presence in this area, only 150km from Addis Ababa, sent a humiliating message to the government and surprised ordinary residents, falsifying the regime’s claim of destroying and eliminating OLA.

In the last one and a half years, OLA’s activities and physical presence were confined mainly to western and southern Oromia, where Command Posts continue to rule. However, in the last six months, OLA has made significant gains in West Shawa, North Shawa, and Southwest Shawa zones. It has started to threaten the free movement of officials in those areas. The government continues to accuse the OLA of kidnapping its local officials and militias with their weapons. Yet despite deploying National Defense Forces and Oromia Special Forces, the government could not stump out OLA activities. OLA has now become a common presence in different districts of central Oromia.

In addition to central Oromia, there are reports of OLA’s activities in Arsi, Bale, and Hararge zones. Last week, PP’s Oromia branch officials reported that OLA confronted Oromia Police in East Hararghe. If confirmed, OLA now seems to be operating in all zones of Oromia. OLA reportedly has four command divisions— the Western Command led by Jaal Marroo, Southern Command led by Jaal Gollicha, Central Command led by Jaal Sagni, and Eastern Command led by Jaal Abba Biyya. Its overall organization, strength, and movements remain a mystery.

According to official sources, after a year of protracted civil war, the OLA has been regaining the upper hand in several parts of western and southern Oromia, and its ranks are swelling by the day. Analysts say OLA has gained more strength than ever before. Local zonal administration sources indicate that OLA is reorganizing local administrations in those districts it has controlled such as in Horo Guduru and other parts of western Oromia. The same sources confirm that nearly 200 armed OLA members invaded Fincha town in Horo Guduru Wallaga Zone on November 9, 2020, and took all the money they found in two banks. OLA did not respond to those claims. In response to recent advances by the OLA, since November 4, 2020, the government has cut telecom and phone lines in Qellem and some parts of Western Wallaga zones for the second time in less than two years. Moreover, in early November, the government dispatched senior federal and regional officials to all zones to help coordinate the campaign against OLA.

Last year, western Oromia was disconnected from the grid (phone, telecom, and electricity) for more than two months following the establishment of the Command Post. Over the last two years, the government repeatedly dispatched senior officials to the area to coordinate the civil war. But those efforts went nowhere. The government has continually accused OLA of killing its officials and taking over local administrations. However, since the area is off-limits for independent journalists, there has been no independent confirmation of the official claims. People in Oromia now joke that they are governed by two competing powers: rural parts belong to the OLA and urban areas belong to the government.

Conclusion

The use of force will not solve the deep-rooted political problems facing Ethiopia. OLA stuck to armed resistance precisely because the government discouraged and frustrated peaceful struggle. The unilateral reform measures of PP and its mismanagement of the transition has led to the current political stalemate and security crisis. Abiy must be advised to sit down and talk with all political forces to re-chart a transitional framework for democratic elections. In his final interview, Haacaaluu decried “an Oromo fighting another Oromo” and characterized the civil war between OLA and Oromia Special Forces as a historical mistake. He was right.

A regional political settlement could have resolved the civil war in Oromia even without involving the federal government. But, so far, PP representatives in Oromia have failed to demonstrate the necessary political will to compromise. It is unfortunate for Oromia and Ethiopia to, once again, revert to armed struggle as the only option to resolve political differences. Ethiopia must end the tragic and senseless wars in Oromia and Tigray. National dialogue and a government of national unity should be fostered rather than beating war drums that could unravel the country. Ethiopia is on the verge of disintegration. To save it, silence the guns now.