Hate speech in Ethiopia: its structural and historical roots 

Coalition of Oromo Advocacy and Human Rights Groups¹

It is a violation of international human rights law to express national, racial, ethnic, and religious hatred in the public space. This includes such expression in public media and social media. It constitutes discrimination, hostility, or violence, as identified by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICEFRD) and Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Hate speech is legally punishable in almost all countries of the world. With the increasing risk and adverse consequences of both misinformation and disinformation enabled by modern communication platforms, state-led measures – legislative and other regulatory mechanisms – against hate speech, online and offline, are rising.

State-led efforts to combat the dissemination of hatred are important to protect the people, but they can also come with the great risk of misapplying the term ‘hate speech’ itself. A January 19, 2021 report by Article 19, a group of civil society organizations and rights advocates, shows that the increasing use of legal measures ostensibly ‘to prevent hate speech’ serve as pretexts by repressive regimes, such as Ethiopia, to suppress freedom of expression, thought and civic engagement. Such policies stifle and suppress an emerging critical and politically conscious, literate, and aware citizenry.

Protecting citizens against genuine hate speech – speech that creates conditions that lead to violence – without limiting their fundamental freedoms requires a delicate balance and in-depth historical, cultural, and socio-political understanding of that specific society. Such a task is complicated and full of pitfalls in a country like Ethiopia with its contested historical narratives and memories and its asymmetric power relationships. Yet, despite these challenges, it is the duty of governments and the responsibility of individuals to continue the delicate balancing act of mitigating hate speech while facilitating civic engagement.

With rapidly evolving technological means of communication, there is a heightened risk of socially embedded antagonisms and contestations finding a way onto social media platforms as well as into print and electronic media outlets, expanding the reach of these antagonisms and vastly increasing the harm to recipients. While open dispassionate conversations on controversial national issues would, in theory, benefit the country and its people, this has failed to happen in Ethiopia. The instability and conflict that characterize current Ethiopian discourse have exposed historically and institutionally embedded hostility and supremacist ideologies in both mainstream and informal communication channels in Ethiopia. Regrettably, such harmful discourse has not only been condoned by the authorities in Ethiopia, but it has been enabled and empowered by the very government which has the duty to regulate such violence.

Social media platforms are being weaponized to change agendas and misguide the international community. Ethiopian government officials, including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, repeatedly use social media platforms to incite violence, create and affirm a false narrative, and spread misinformation and disinformation. The government and its supporters also use social media to misinterpret and pervert international calls to halt the war and investigate potential war crimes. More recently, they have deployed these tools or their shutdown to divert global humanitarian concern and focus away from war-impacted parts of the country.

Despite the fact that hate speech has been officially made ‘illegal’ in Ethiopia, Oromo and southern peoples report that it is not unusual to see and hear Amhara religious, military, and political leaders step forward with impunity as the ‘civilizers’ and ‘architects’ of Ethiopia. The approach of these self-appointed spokespersons often reflects Orthodox teaching, i.e., that the Amhara are the chosen people, the ‘Chewa,’ with a divine right to rule. Such assumptions of privilege, entitlement, and superiority embody a disdain and hatred for other peoples at every level of society and state. Local, regional, and national government decisions and minor details of bureaucracy and governance are infused with an asymmetric view of Ethiopian society in which built-in assumptions and the language of denigration are conveyed. The assumption of the superiority of one group over others pervades the national and international media, politicians’ public statements, and postings of non-governmental organizations. It is hate speech without accountability.

Since Abiy assumed office, his government has exacerbated this asymmetry by speaking solely of ‘making Ethiopia great again’ and the one-party dominated parliament issuing a proclamation that identifies as ‘terrorists’ major political groups who counter that official government narrative. By taking this position, Abiy has not only suppressed open public discussion but has criminalized certain forms of expression and fanned the flames of hate speech. In encouraging the proponents of the ‘Make Ethiopia Great Again’ narrative to castigate persons and groups who dissent, the Abiy administration is openly advancing and justifying violence against those who articulate a different narrative and seek a different future for the country. In this quest, both religious leaders and retired military generals of the Imperial and the Derg eras are allowed access to the state media and sympathetic private media outlets where they utilize hate speech with impunity. This kind of open hate speech is often unrecognized outside of Ethiopia and is thus echoed without further examination or question on many national and international platforms.

The subtleties of this distinction in identifying hate speech and its targets are intricate for observers to appreciate. Many, especially among those in the broader South, express that their experience in Ethiopia is exploitative and imperialist. But when they post their truth, they are unfairly reported as ‘purveyors of hate speech’ by party loyalists or political opponents who monitor social media. International monitors have few criteria available to determine the veracity of these reports. Such claims spectacularly fail to respect individual or group rights among the sectors of the population who do not share the official perspective on Ethiopia’s past glory and ‘greatness.’ The issue is not whether Ethiopia may have had a ‘great’ past but whether any speech that disputes that claim should be identified as ‘hate speech’ rather than ‘free speech.’

Neutral international observers who are called upon to discern ‘hate speech’ in Ethiopia should observe that it is a state where Amhara culture, language, religion, and identity have historically been venerated. The ‘Make Ethiopia Great Again’ narrative calls for a return to that condition.  Others, i.e., non-Amhara, are demonized for resisting this direction and labeled ‘separatists,’ ‘anti-unity,’ ‘ethnic,’ and ‘narrow.’  As such, they are designated ‘other’ subjects. They see themselves as victims of the empire, persons who have never benefited from the empire. Their public posts reflect their reality. Yet, these posts are instantly tagged as ‘offensive’ and ‘anti-Ethiopia’ and, as such, labeled as ‘hate speech.’ Instead, this is the speech of dissent and expression of an alternative vision for the populations in Ethiopia. The proponents of Ethiopian greatness hold one view, and the detractors hold another. Whether these positions devolve into ‘hate speech’ should be determined by criteria other than political, such as whether they overtly incite violence or intend to incite violence or harm. There is a measurable sense in which forcing citizens in a country to applaud only one interpretation of the past insults the victims of those times and whitewashes historical injustices. This speech incentivizes and legitimizes violence and injustice.

Based on the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, we, therefore, recommend for the Ethiopian government, the populations within the country, and its diaspora to:

1. Refrain from employing, encouraging, or tolerating the use of hate speech in political discourse.
2. Stop the utilization of state-controlled and government-affiliated media and social media platforms in promoting and circulating hate speech against its opponents or dissenters.
3. Eliminate the ongoing politics of hate and violence directed at dissenters and instead recognize the structural and historical roots of hate speech in Ethiopia to determine effective ways to prevent it;
4. Refrain from labeling criticism of the government as hate speech, thus using the law as a tool to suppress freedom of opinion and expression.

Coalition of Oromo Advocacy and Human Rights Groups 

Media Contact: Dr Trevor Trueman +44 (0)1684 573722; osg@talktalk.net 

Signatories:
Advocacy for Oromia
Melbourne, Australia

Baro Tumsa Institute
Greenbelt, MD, USA

Oromia Support Group
Malvern, UK, and Melbourne, Australia

Oromia Global Forum
Tacoma Park, MD, USA

Oromo Advocacy Alliance
Washington DC, USA

Oromo Human Rights and Relief Organization
Hannover, Germany

Oromo Legacy Leadership and Advocacy Association
Falls Church, VA, USA

Oromo Professionals Group
Washington, DC, USA

Union of Oromo Communities in Canada
Ontario, Canada