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The conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has caused unimaginable destruction and human suffering. The war and its far-reaching ramifications have metastasized into the Amhara and Afar states. In the last two weeks, the Ethiopian army has re-captured several towns in the Amhara region from Tigrayan forces. TPLF has said it made a strategic retreat and withdrew from occupied territories to pave the way for peace. Regardless of the particulars, the ruling Prosperity Party is conducting public consultations as it weighs calls for peace talks. The government has also unveiled a Dialogue Commission ostensibly to jump-start an all-inclusive political process.
Still, it is worth repeating that the conflict in Ethiopia is far from over. What started as a “law enforcement” operation has morphed into a full-fledged civil war with no end in sight. Ethiopia is now at a crossroads, embarking into uncharted waters, tout court. Even more worrying, the social fabric that has glued ordinary Ethiopians together for so long is rupturing, mainly because of partisan propaganda from competing political forces. For many, the jingoistic nationalism and the polarized political landscape make Ethiopian politics a hard nut to crack. In the last three years, we attributed all of Ethiopia’s problems to the TPLF by exonerating the federal government to a lesser or greater extent. In doing so, we failed to acknowledge, address, and come to grips with the original sin.
Mismanaged transition
In hindsight, the 2018 popular protests spearheaded by the Qeerroo (Oromo youth) and the fragmentation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) prompted the resignation of the then Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn. The ascension of Abiy Ahmed to the throne was followed by sweeping reforms that ushered in the release of political prisoners, the return of exiled political parties into the country, eased the ban on the previously muzzled media, and paved the way for the Ethio-Eritrea peace accord with Isaias Afeworki, for which Abiy was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. In the process, the TPLF, a prominent actor in the preceding 27 years, was sidelined from the political arena. There was no transitional justice approach that provided redress to the victims of systematic and massive human rights violations under EPRDF. Additionally, the new government was not bold enough to transform the political system, conflicts, and other conditions precipitating the abuses.
Abiy willfully awarded, if not exempted, the criminals without any accountability. Instead of an all-inclusive national reconciliation and dialogue process, he was determined to spread the gospel of Ethiopianism, love, medemer (synergy), and reconciliation to address the country’s deep-seated political problems. None of these has been achieved, nor have any of the burning issues been given due attention by the incumbent. Abiy’s efforts to absolve himself from the system he had been serving for years and rhetorical excesses, such as references to his TPLF mentors as የቀን ጅቦች (daylight hyenas), raised questions about his integrity.
From the outset, the Abiy regime invested too much time consolidating power at the center rather than setting a fair game for the political stakeholders and the media to play their part positively. For example, a documentary on the scandal of the Metals and Industry Corporation was considered an attempt to purge TPLF officials by planting a seed of incertitude within its top echelon.
The prime minister’s secretive deals with Eritrea were another of his cacophony of conflicting policies that have generated resentment from the TPLF and the Tigray people. The calls for immediate elections and a nationwide dialogue fell on deaf ears. To make matters worse, Abiy vowed to lead the transition all by himself, even suggesting there was no need to hold an election, which signaled his thirst for power. There was no platform for “elite bargaining” on the contesting issues to discuss the fate of the federal arrangement, border disputes between regions, and the constitution to engage with long-standing competing narratives meaningfully. Finally, Abiy decided to disband the EPRDF to impose his vision of Ethiopia on others.
The formation of the Prosperity Party
The idea of forming the Prosperity Party (PP) came when the member parties of the former EPRDF were showing some improvement in listening to the plight of their people with the help of populist leaders. The newly formed Oromo Democratic Party and the Amhara Democratic Party have pledged to learn from their mistakes and rectify their wrongs. Both have attempted to lure their members by changing their party flags and newly founded nationalistic fervor. The TPLF, for its part, preferred to re-group in Tigray and prepare for possible psychological and physical assault from the federal government.
Abiy’s centralizing policy was motivated by complete control over his opponents, insatiable greed for power, and a hazy vision of Ethiopia’s future.
Firstly, the centralization of power has decimated dissenting voices within and outside the party. PP has never convened to elect its central committee.
Secondly, the formation of PP has squandered the chance of creating a favorable environment for a thriving democracy by forging trust and cooperation among the Amhara, Oromo, and Tegaru elites.
Thirdly, it is challenging to differentiate Abiy from Ethiopia and vice versa, like his predecessors, Mengistu Hailemariam or Meles Zenawi.
Fourthly, PP’s formation has enabled Abiy to appoint submissive leaders at the regional level who will only serve his interests rather than those of the people they claim to represent.
The Oromo question
If any group takes the lion’s share in the regime change of 2018, it is the Qeerroos. Abiy rose to power on the back of a popular uprising; this would rightly necessitate gaining the acceptance of the Oromo public, which has suffered under successive Ethiopian regimes. So, what Abiy did was to use his one-time ally, Lamma Magarsa, to gain the popular support he was looking for. To this end, the latter even convinced the Asmara-based Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and its army to return home in an agreement, the details of which were still unknown.
Lamma was hailed for his populist sentiments in Oromia while under immense pressure from the Ethiopianist camp for his Oromo nationalist credentials. Abiy, too, had the support of many Oromos in the early days of his tenure. His disparaging comments on Oromo nationalism raised eyebrows among many Oromos who trusted and bestowed on him the title of the Ilma Abbaa Gadaa (Son of Aba Gada). Unfortunately, it didn’t stop there, much to the dismay of the elites who were ferociously leading the transition.
Following this, the term ‘menga,’ meaning herds, was uttered by a poet at a lavish dinner held at his palace. The live broadcast enraged many people and has been interpreted as an insult to the Oromo youths who sacrificed their lives to usher in an era of change. Abiy continued to double down despite his already waning reputation by erecting the sculptures of Emperor Menelik and Haile Selassie inside his palace. This was followed by an attempt to assassinate Jawar Mohammed, a vocal critic of Abiy who opposed the formation of PP. Next, Lamma was purged and held under house arrest for months. Lastly, the murder of the iconic singer Haacaaluu Hundeessa resulted in the detention of Jawar and other opposition leaders, who played a significant part in this change. The Oromo questions which were raised during the 2014-2018 protests, namely the quest for an end to governmental imprisonment and repression; the right to self-administration and choose democratically elected leaders; making Afaan Oromoo a federal working language; halting the eviction of Oromo farmers found around Addis Ababa; and the rights of the Oromo over the city, remain unanswered to date.
Ethnic Polarization
Ethiopia is divided along ethnic and political lines, and the last three years have only exacerbated it. The TPLF rule led to the domination of a minority group in every realm of Ethiopian society. The absence of brute force and civilized discourse pushed the country down the path of lawlessness and anarchy since the early days of reform.
The political climate was filled with extreme polarization among contending political actors from abroad and those inside the country who seized the opportunity to vent out their long-repressed grievances. As a result, the government appeared too impotent to protect citizens from mob justice and ethnic clashes.
Instead, it continued to blame the TPLF for the multilayered crises in all corners of the country.
The youths who have been struggling to change the oppressive system were either manipulated or their active role diminished.
At the same time, the change put the country’s rigid political culture to the test. Without a thorough understanding of and tolerance for ideas, the young and those with little interest in politics were forced to confront the burgeoning social and mainstream media. In return, the government has widely exploited this gap and has successfully fed its propaganda to disgruntled youths who are not yet ready to pay another sacrifice.
Generally speaking, the government has worked hard to instill suspicion among the major ethnic groups using its instruments. As a result, they are now at war with each other, causing immeasurable damage to the social fabric that exists among them, which would take many years to heal.
In the face of the crumbling economy, the cost of reconstructing the infrastructure remains too high. People-to-people relationships and societal cohesion have been severely harmed. As it stands, the conflicting parties are not ready to reciprocate with the other based on mutual trust and reconciliation.
It is crystal clear that the ouster of Abiy alone will not herald a lasting solution to the complex socio-economic and political problems in Ethiopia. Some people are still wary of the following system that will take its stead. As a result, creating viable institutions that transcend strong leaders is critical to overcoming difficult times and developing a democratic culture as a nation.
Failure to build institutions
Institutions are the building blocks through which every society can achieve material and political needs. No matter how strong, an individual cannot replace the role of institutions. This is particularly true in Ethiopia, where ethnic polarization, political repression, transitional flaws, etc., are rampant and call for collective institutional action. Ethiopia needs strong, accessible, and viable institutions for democratic culture to flourish. In its heyday, the TPLF prevented the existence of independent institutions. Civil organizations were prevented from participating in and serving their people. Any institution that posed a political threat to the ideology of revolutionary democracy was forced to close or go into exile. Thus, it wasn’t easy to find organizations that would fill the void when the government was not functioning well. The TPLF manipulated or made civil society subservient to its political rhetoric. This, in turn, enfeebled the growth of democracy and human rights.
Under the Abiy administration, the hope of establishing strong institutions was dashed from the start. By appointing individuals who subscribe to and are affiliated with the ruling party, Abiy squandered the hope of building impartial institutions. What’s more, most institutions are still in the shadow of the EPRDF and grappling with the dilemma of choosing between democratization and repression.
The justice system’s failure, religious institutions, diplomatic relations, human rights agencies, etc., has severely affected Ethiopia.
The implications
Understanding the underlying reasons for the current war helps evaluate the sequence and the larger context it unfolded. Most people have tried to knowingly or unknowingly downplay the structural grounds of the conflict of which the TPLF and successive regimes are a part. PP takes the blame for its inability to solve or acknowledge these complex issues without resorting to a civil war.
Essentially, this is a purely political and ideological war. And each element is interlocked with the subsequent events that follow it.
First, the mismanagement of the delicate transition is regrettable. The current crises could have been averted had there been an agreed roadmap among all stakeholders.
Second, the lack of elite bargaining, especially among the Amhara and Oromo, has created room for adverse competition and the severing of ties between the two largest communities.
Third, the TPLF has continued with its aggression, endangering attempts to find solutions in one way or another. Broadly speaking, this war results from disagreements over the conflicting past, a failure to deal with the present, and a lack of uncertainty about Ethiopia’s future.
The Way Forward
Despite all the challenges and complexities, it is possible to reach a consensus on preventing further bloodshed and the loss of innocent lives with genuine political will. The starting point is a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement that would enable all warring parties to peacefully resolve their conflicting narratives, constitutional matters, territorial disputes, division of power between the federal and regional governments, etc.
For this to happen, both the federal government and rebels must acknowledge each other’s demands.
This would require the federal government to remove the terrorist label from the TPLF and Oromo Liberation Army and the rebels to acknowledge the federal government’s legitimacy. The government would also need to allow unfettered humanitarian access to Tigray, Oromia, and all conflict-affected areas. The help of the international community, such as the African Union, European Union, and United Nations, would be indispensable.
It is also important to prioritize an inclusive national dialogue led by Ethiopians. The government should facilitate the process with other civil society organizations, religious leaders, and notable individuals to ensure lasting peace and reconciliation.
Releasing all political prisoners would pave the way for an inclusive transitional process. As difficult as it may seem, it is essential to arrange a platform for a transitional government recognized by all stakeholders, which would lead to an election within a short period.
Last but not least, a transitional justice approach is of paramount importance to heal societal divisions and hold the perpetrators accountable for all the crimes committed in the previous three years and beyond.
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